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Risk regulation, trade and international law: 
Debating the precautionary principle in and around the WTO 
ABSTRACT 
The precautionary principle is one of the most contested principles in international law. 
In the context of trade regulation in particular, it has been a source of concern to those 
who fear that it might help to justify existing non-tariff barriers to trade or create addi-
tional ones. Proponents of the principle, in turn, argue that it is needed to fend off un-
warranted health and environmental risks in situations where scientific uncertainty pre-
vails, even if this works against the liberalisation of trade. In these contests the question 
of where and when the precautionary principle should be applied is inextricably linked 
to the question of what it means in the first place. Starting from the observation that 
consensus on a precise definition is missing both in legal-political practice and in aca-
demic scholarship, the present paper is concerned precisely with those practical inter-
pretative contests which result from the principle’s ambiguity. We focus on attempts to 
agree legally binding definitions in the context of international trade regulation. The 
core of the paper is an empirical analysis of debates on several specific aspects of the 
precautionary principle, which were at issue during the past decade in four different 
international institutions: the WTO dispute settlement, some of the WTO’s political 
committees, the Codex Alimentarius Commission (in particular its Committee on Gen-
eral Principles), and the conference of states which negotiated the Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety. Differences and similarities among these institutions are then analysed in 
a comparative perspective, taking up various contested issues one by one. From our 
findings we derive a set of hypotheses regarding the conditions under which, and the 
legal or political pathways on which, the precautionary principle (and perhaps other 
abstract normative ideas of a similar type as well) can make a difference to the out-
comes of international decision-making. 
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Risk regulation, trade and international law: 
Debating the precautionary principle in and around the WTO* 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The international trading system, with the World Trade Organization (WTO) as its insti-
tutional core, is quite deliberately based on the single goal of removing barriers to the 
trans-border exchange of goods. While tariffs were for a long time the most significant 
barriers to trade, non-tariff barriers have now become much more important in many 
areas. Among non-tariff barriers to trade, the regulations that nation-states establish to 
protect the health and safety of humans and the natural environment (“risk regulation”) 
potentially play a prominent role. Protective regulations as such are not necessarily at 
odds with WTO law. On the contrary, the legitimacy of domestic measures “necessary 
to protect human, animal or plant life or health” (Art. XX (b) GATT) is explicitly ac-
knowledged. In order to prevent its protectionist abuse, however, domestic risk regula-
tion is subject to a number of constraints or “disciplines” under WTO law. Since the 
conclusion of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) at the end 
of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, the requirement of scientific justification 
is central among these disciplines is (see in particular Art. 2.2, 5.1 SPS). In other words, 
what distinguishes a legitimate protective measure from illegitimate protectionism is, 
inter alia, that the former can scientifically be shown to counter a demonstrable risk.  
Straightforward as it may be in principle, this system is based on a series of non-
trivial presuppositions. Quite evidently, it presupposes the availability of relatively un-
contested scientific knowledge. It is in cases where such knowledge is not available that 
the precautionary principle can come into play. Although this principle has been around 
for quite some time, its meaning is still ambiguous.1 There are several seemingly simple 
definitions, often likening the precautionary principle to common-sensical notions such 
                                                 
*  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference on “Legal Patterns of Transnational Social Regu-
lation and International Trade”, organised by Christian Joerges and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann at the European 
University Institute, Florence, 24-25 September 2004. Our thanks to participants in the conference, in particular 
Theofanis Christoforou, as well as to our colleagues in the on-going research project on “Social Regulation and 
World Trade”, namely Christiane Conrad, Ulrike Ehling, Christine Godt, Josef Falke and Christian Joerges for 
helpful comments, and to David Gerl for able research assistance. 
1  Environmental policy in Germany of the 1970s is frequently cited as the original source of the precautionary 
principle (e.g., Gehring and Cordonier Segger 2003: 2-3; O'Riordan, Cameron, and Jordan 2001a: 11; Woolcock 
2002: 2-3); others point to Sweden as the principle’s first institutional home (Löfstedt, Fischhoff, and Fischhoff 
2002: 382; Sand 2000: 448). While its diffusion throughout many nations and international institutions may in-
deed have started in these places, at least some of its component ideas are no doubt much older. 
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as “better safe than sorry”, or “look before you leap”. Neither in the legal-political realm 
nor in academia, however, is a definition to be found which would be both precise and 
consensual. A reasonable working definition which takes into account (in brackets) so-
me of the most important controversial aspects might go something like this: Regulatory 
action (subject to certain constraints) should be allowed (or even prescribed) to counter 
risks to human health and the environment, even if (the nature and) the magnitude of 
this risk are not (yet) scientifically proven. In the present paper we are concerned pre-
cisely with those interpretative contests which result from the precautionary principle’s 
ambiguity, and which are aimed at legally binding definitions.2  
A big part of these contests surrounding the precautionary principle revolves around 
seemingly arcane technical questions such as what specific kind of horticultural meas-
ures are suited to keep apple trees free from a particular bacterial disease; or whether a 
set of guidelines for the conduct of foodstuff risk assessment, developed by the subsidi-
ary body of an international organisation most people have never even heard about (i.e., 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission – see below), should apply to that organisation 
only or also to its individual member states. Lurking behind these technical legal and 
natural-scientific issues, however, are core issues of contemporary debates on sover-
eignty and global governance, democracy and expertise, or the taming and enabling of 
economic globalisation. Thus the precautionary principle is sometimes considered as a 
tool for preserving – at least in cases of “scientific uncertainty” – nation-states’ regula-
tory leeway, which tends to be increasingly narrowed by the dense web of rules consti-
tuting the multilateral trade system. At other times, the precautionary principle is under-
stood – among both supporters and opponents – as attacking the very science “mantra” 
(Kerr 2003) which underlies the multilateral trade system’s approach to social regula-
tion. And the context in which resulting conflicts are settled is itself continuously evolv-
ing, insofar as nation-states not only decide on whether or not to apply the precautionary 
principle at home, but are also involved in various attempts to institutionalise (some 
version of) the principle in internationally, in the trade sector and beyond. 
Especially in the context of on-going debates about the “international rule of law” 
and “legalization”, it is important to remember that nation-states are not only the sub-
jects of international law and thus the addressees of the “rule of law”, to the extent that 
                                                 
2  As will be shown below, an important element of these struggles is the question of whether the idea of precaution 
should at all be considered a principle in the strict, legal sense. In a looser sense, however, the term “precaution-
ary principle” is widely, although not universally, used to designate the idea(s) in question. For the sake of con-
venience, we follow this practice throughout the paper, but without wanting to take a position on its legal status. 
Wherever the latter is at issue, we will use more specific language to differentiate between the precautionary 
principle as an idea and as a legal principle. 
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it exists internationally, but also – along with other actors – its authors. They perform 
this role quite actively, fighting about the proverbial commata. This is certainly nothing 
new, but it has somewhat receded to the background in current discussions of “legalisa-
tion” in international relations, where there has on the whole been more attention to 
certain characteristics of international law than to the process by which it is created.3 
We ought thus not to look only at how an emerging rule of law might bind states in their 
external behaviour and whether this is desirable, but also at what role states play in 
bringing about this transformation. The fate of the precautionary principle in and around 
the WTO provides ample opportunities for the study of this intricate relationship.  
We begin in the following section by offering a rough typology of existing research 
in legal and political science on the precautionary principle, so as to contextualise our 
own approach to the subject matter, the specifics of which are subsequently introduced 
(2.). The core of the paper is an empirical analysis of four trade-related international 
institutions and debates on various aspects of the precautionary principle therein (3.). 
Differences and similarities among these institutions are then analysed in comparative 
perspective, taking up various contested issues one by one (4.). Finally, we summarise 
our findings by way of submitting a few hypotheses to be explored in further research 
(5.). 
2 THE APPROACH OF THIS PAPER IN THE CONTEXT OF EXISTING 
RESEARCH 
The lack of consensus on the precautionary principle’s precise meaning makes analysis 
of its role in legal and political processes difficult, but at the same time also helps to 
raise scholarly attention – so we might conclude from the enormous amount of attention 
the precautionary principle has received in recent legal and social-science scholarship. 
Roughly, this literature can be divided into three broad strands (which are often com-
bined in individual books and articles):  
(1) An abstract-analytical strand which explores the logical and ethical foundations 
of the principle and the variety of interpretations it can meaningfully be given in theory 
(e.g., Godard 1997). From this variety of interpretations some authors have constructed 
a limited number of ideal-typical versions of the precautionary principle that can be 
classified according to the answers they give to a series of general questions (Applegate 
2000; Sandin 1999). Comparing the precautionary principle to alternative principles of, 
or approaches to, risk regulation is another important theme in this strand (De Sadeleer 
2002; Majone 2002; Morris 2002). 
                                                 
3  See Finnemore and Toope (2001) for related criticism of the legalisation literature (referring especially to Gold-
stein et al. 2000 and other contributions in that volume). 
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(2) A normative strand which criticises or advocates either the principle as such or 
specific interpretations of it. Wholesale rejection of the precautionary principle may be 
rare but it does exist (Adler 2002); more commonly particular – e.g., “strong” as op-
posed to “weak” – understandings of it are rejected as logically inconsistent or socially 
undesirable (Stewart 2002; Sunstein 2003; Van den Belt 2003). Also to this genre be-
longs a whole series of more favourable attempts at reducing the principle’s ambiguity 
and specifying its legal and institutional implications, be it in general (e.g., Tickner 
1999) or for a particular area (Bohanes 2002; Peel 2004 for WTO law), in the latter case 
often at the explicit request of the political authorities (Renn et al. 2003 for the EC). 
(3) An empirical strand which mostly looks for legal and political formulations of the 
principle in different places: what Fisher (2002) calls – and criticises as – “precaution 
spotting”. This is probably the broadest strand. It includes not only contributions which 
collect and compare emanations of the precautionary principle across policy areas, 
countries (various chapters in O'Riordan, Cameron, and Jordan 2001b) and regions 
(especially EC and US, see Christoforou 2004; Daemen 2003; König 2002; Prakash and 
Kollman 2003), levels of governance (Schroeter 2002; Scott and Vos 2002), or combi-
nations of the above (De Sadeleer 2002; EEA 2002; Wiener and Rogers 2002). This 
strand also encompasses analyses which focus on the principle’s formulation in individ-
ual, more or less narrowly defined substantive and geographical areas.4 In the legal lit-
erature, analysis of particular court decisions is also an important part of this strand.5 A 
further variation of this theme is constituted by analyses of the principle’s diffusion 
from one jurisdiction, issue area or governance level to others (Cameron and Wade-
Gery 1992; Freestone and Hey 1996; Jordan and O'Riordan 1999).  
The approach we take in this paper falls into the third, “empirical” category. This is 
an important point to note, for it implies that we do not take a stance here on if or how 
the precautionary principle should be applied and interpreted, be it in general or in a 
particular context. Instead, we want to find out about how the principle is in fact em-
ployed by individual actors and reflected in international decisions. The scholarly litera-
ture on the principle abounds with controversies – as indicated by the absence of any-
thing resembling even remotely a consensual definition. The question, then, is whether 
                                                 
4  Numerous examples could be cited for this latter category. By way of illustration, consider analyses of European 
GMO regulation and the role of the precautionary principle therein (Levidow 2001; Levidow, Carr, and Wield 
2000; Scott 2003; Tait 2001).  
5  Commentaries on WTO jurisprudence are cited below, 3.1. On recent relevant decisions of the European Court of 
Justice and Court of First Instance see Segnana (2002), Ladeur (2003), MacMaoláin (2003), Dabrowska (2004) 
and Szawlowska (2004). Of course such analysis often feeds into the second, normative strand of the literature as 
well. 
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the controversies in the literature find a parallel in the “real world” of international legal 
and political practice. In addressing this issue we inevitably draw on the first, abstract-
analytical strand of the literature as well, insofar as categories developed there are used 
to structure our discussion (most explicitly in Section 4). For example, we employ the 
commonly made differentiation of risk regulation into the stages of risk assessment, risk 
management and risk communication. To which of the first two stages the precautionary 
principle applies is one of the most prominent issues in the debates analysed below (see 
below, p. 35). 
What we hope to add to the existing empirical literature is, on the one hand, greater 
attention to the controversies that surround the principle when applied in real-world 
interactions. It is these interactions that shape what the “precaution spotter” eventually 
gets to see.6 Thus we look at political negotiations in various international fora on which 
we attempt to get a grip mainly by tracing the main controversies through the negotiat-
ing process. We also look at one judicial body, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, 
focussing on the interpretation of relevant WTO norms it proffers and diverging inter-
pretations advocated by WTO Members. On the other hand, by comparing relevant de-
bates across several different international fora, we hope to lay the basis for subsequent 
work of a less descriptive and more explanatory kind. To this end, we will develop sev-
eral hypotheses from the empirical material on which future research might build. In 
particular, they might serve to explore the institutional conditions under which the pre-
cautionary principle, and perhaps similar principled ideas in international law and poli-
tics as well, can help to deal with conflicts between free trade and social regulation.  
The international institutions which we have selected for closer analysis are briefly 
introduced in the remainder of this section. Generally speaking, given its position at the 
centre of the international trading system, the WTO is an obvious forum to look at, but 
it is by no means the only one. WTO law is related to other international law by way of 
formal or informal relations, and what actors might not achieve in the WTO, they might 
try to achieve elsewhere. The existence of overlapping norms, belonging to the law of 
different international organizations and purporting to regulate the same subject matter, 
creates considerable legal uncertainty and political tensions. It seems, consequently, 
appropriate to not just focus on the WTO, but to take into account also developments in 
other fora that give rise to this kind of legal ambiguity. Put differently, if we want to 
                                                 
6  We use the term “international debates” – in a very broad sense, to also include legal proceedings as well as the 
participation of supranational entities such as the WTO dispute settlement bodies and the European Commission 
– as an umbrella term for this kind of interactions. We also use the more specific term “international negotia-
tions” where appropriate, i.e., where state (including EC) representatives interact with each other in the absence 
of a third-party adjudicator.  
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understand what happens to the rule of law across levels of governance, a focus on indi-
vidual institutions or on particular international regimes is almost certainly insufficient. 
Institutional interactions and emerging “regime complexes” ought to be taken into ac-
count as well.7  
More specifically, then, we have selected four fora for closer analysis, in all of which 
the precautionary principle was at least considered for being set on the agenda: (1) 
WTO dispute settlement as the judicial branch of the WTO, (2) several committees as 
part of the political branch of the WTO, and in addition two fora external to the WTO, 
one of them linked formally to WTO law, namely (3) the Codex Alimentarius Commis-
sion (CAC), and the other linked to the WTO by a more informal – and largely unre-
solved - legal relationship, (4) the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. We start by looking 
at that part of the WTO framework which has probably attracted most public attention: 
the dispute settlement (Section 3.1). Our focus there are the dispute settlement cases that 
are related to the precautionary principle. But of course the WTO does not only consist 
of the dispute settlement mechanism; it also has an infrastructure of political bodies. 
The political arm of the WTO, in contrast to the EC, does not have a competence for 
secondary legislation of its own and is thus much weaker than the dispute settlement.8 
Still, in these political bodies negotiations take place and relevant information is ex-
changed. We focus on several committees where negotiations with possible relevance 
for the precautionary principle took place, namely the Committee on Trade and Envi-
ronment (CTE), the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Commit-
tee) and the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Committee) (3.2). The 
CTE was brought into existence in the course of the GATT’s Uruguay Round. Its man-
date is to discuss the trade-and-environment nexus and the adequate role of the WTO 
therein.9 In contrast to the CTE, the SPS and TBT Committees are both charged with 
administering the respective WTO Agreements and performing specific tasks assigned 
to them therein.10 The analysis will be completed by a brief glance at discussions about 
the precautionary principle in other WTO committees.11 
                                                 
7  See Raustiala and Victor (2004) for the notion of “regime complexes”. Institutional interaction (or “linkage”, 
“interplay”) more generally has recently been the subject of increasing attention in both legal and political science 
(Oberthür and Gehring 2003; Oberthür and Gehring 2004; Trachtman 2002; Young 2002). 
8  Which has lead to a good deal of criticism (see Bogdandy 2002: 266-280; Ehlermann 2002: 632-638). 
9  The mandate is contained in the Decision on Trade and Environment (http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/envir_e/issu1_e.htm). For the CTE’s development see in more detail Ehling (2005). 
10  The TBT Committee is, for example, charged with granting exceptions to the TBT Agreement to developing 
countries (Art. 12:8), notification of TBT measures (Art. 15:2) and review of the Agreement (Art. 15:3). The SPS 
Committee has the mandate to coordinate harmonisation efforts with other international organisations (Art. 3:5 
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Afterwards we move further away from the “core” of the WTO and look at linkages 
with other international organisations whose law has or may have an impact on WTO 
law and vice versa. The first of these other organizations is the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (CAC), the body set up jointly by the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1963 which is responsible for 
developing standards in the area of food safety (3.3). With the establishment of the 
WTO, the importance of these standards, which are not binding per se, has significantly 
increased: the SPS Agreement in its Art. 3:2 contains an incentive for WTO Members to 
design their national sanitary and phytosanitary standards in conformity with the CAC 
standards by stipulating a presumption that national (and regional) standards conform-
ing to the CAC standards are consistent with WTO law. The standards of the CAC are, 
hence, formally related to WTO law. Thus, if the CAC incorporates the precautionary 
principle into its framework, this will have important repercussions on what sanitary 
measures precisely WTO Members might licitly take under WTO law.12  
Finally, we look at the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, negotiated under the aus-
pices of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD – 3.4). Although its connec-
tion with the WTO is much more indirect than is the case with Codex, the connection is 
nonetheless existent.13 The relationship between WTO law and multilateral environ-
mental agreements (MEAs) such as the Cartagena Protocol is still largely unresolved, at 
least on the political level.14 Moreover, the WTO legal order is part of the larger interna-
tional legal order, which has already influenced the way WTO law is interpreted and 
may further do so in the future (see Marceau 1999:108-139). The Cartagena Protocol 
                                                                                                                                               
SPS), develop guidelines for the application of certain provisions of the agreement (Art. 5:5) and grant exceptions 
to developing countries (Art. 10:3). 
11  Another forum we might have included in our analysis is the WTO’s Trade Policy Review Mechanism, another 
political body of the WTO. Precaution was occasionally an issue there, see the documents from the two most re-
cent trade policy reviews of the EC, WT/TPR/S/72, WT/TPR/S/102 (both secretariat reports) and WT/TPR/M/72, 
WT/TPR/M/72/Add. 1, WT/TPR/M/102, WT/TPRM/M102/Add. 2 (minutes of the meeting, including the ad-
vance questions of other Members directed to the EC and the EC’s replies). Ultimately, however, the TPRM is 
not designed to produce any concrete policy outcome, but rather serves as a forum for enhancing transparency in 
trade policy, which makes it a less-than-ideal complement to our selection of fora. 
12  See section 3.3 below for a more detailed description of the function of CAC standards under WTO law.  
13  The connection between WTO and Cartagena Protocol is recognised and discussed in a substantial body of litera-
ture. In addition to citations in the text, see inter alia Isaac, Phillipson, and Kerr (2001), Chaytor, Palmer, and 
Werksman (2003), Winham (2003), Böckenförde (2004), Oberthür and Gehring (2005). 
14  See the status quo of the discussions in the CTE, Summary Report on the Ninth Meeting of the Committee on 
Trade and Environment Special Session, 22 June 2004, TN/TE/R/9. 
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thus has the potential to influence the interpretation of WTO law with regard to meas-
ures concerning those genetically modified organisms (GMOs) to which it applies.  
For each of these fora, we investigate what role the precautionary principle played, 
how successful proponents of the principle and its particular interpretations were in 
promoting their position, and in what way the precautionary principle is enshrined in the 
resulting decisions.In doing so, we will lay particular emphasis on controversies regard-
ing specific aspects of the precautionary principle, rather than the principle as such. This 
reflects the observation, stated above, that strictly speaking there is no such thing as 
“the principle as such” – its meaning is the very subject, rather than a presupposition, of 
the debates we analyse. As we shall see, our focus on specific contested aspects also 
reflects the actual distribution of opinions in these debates, where fundamental opposi-
tion to the precautionary principle (whatever way it is defined) turns out to be less im-
portant than disagreement over how it should be understood, and where it should be 
applied.  
The approach we take, which is to concentrate on officially stated positions and rea-
sons, and a corresponding neglect of the “real” interests hidden behind such “rhetoric”, 
might invite the objection that we miss out on what is actually driving relevant devel-
opments. E.g., one may suspect that the precautionary principle is advocated by the EC 
(the principle’s main proponent internationally) not out of genuine concern for health 
and environment but so as to protect the ailing European biotechnology industry from 
American competitors (cf. Bailey 2002: 8), or because the European Commission con-
siders it easier to pronounce a new regulatory philosophy than to fix institutional defi-
ciencies that produce “regulatory failure” in the first place (Majone 2002). We take se-
riously such sceptical interpretations, insofar as we do not assume that state actors’ offi-
cial pronouncements are generally to be taken at face value. Nor do we believe, how-
ever, that “rhetoric” should generally be considered mere window-dressing without any 
significance for actual behaviour. Such an impoverished notion of rhetoric is of doubtful 
value in most social settings, if only because it has nothing to say about the conditions 
under which rhetoric is likely to work.15 In the specific kinds of setting we are interested 
in, the rhetoric/reality dichotomy is even less useful, because (a) we are dealing with 
actors all of which can be assumed to have strategic capacities, rather than with a single 
strategic manipulator facing an easy-to-fool crowd; (b) we are specifically dealing with 
legal argumentation which, although it is of course commonly employed for all kinds of 
insincere purposes, is subject to specific constraints that make it hard to completely con-
trol its effects; and (c) the setting is already imbued with legal and non-legal norms of 
various sorts, which effectively prevents the merely strategic use of normative argu-
                                                 
15  For a richer understanding of “rhetoric” see Maier (2003, with further references). 
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ments (on this latter point see in a different context Schimmelfennig 2003). For our pur-
poses, then, rhetoric in an important sense is reality – the reality of international debates 
aimed at producing legally binding decisions, in which both actors and observers are 
well-advised to take seriously what is being said, quite independently of why it is being 
said.  
3 THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE ON THE AGENDA OF TRADE-RELATED 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
Having stated the paper’s basic approach and how it relates to existing research, we now 
turn to the empirical analysis, concerning the way the precautionary principle appears 
on the agenda of trade-related international institutions.  
3.1 WTO dispute settlement 
The forum that has gained most attention within academia and in the larger public is the 
dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO. The dispute settlement mechanism has, sin-
ce its thorough re-modelling in the course of the Uruguay Round, dealt with several 
cases that touch upon issues of precaution. They all concern the interpretation of the 
SPS Agreement, which sets forth the conditions under which WTO Members might take 
measures to protect human, animal or plant health from certain risks. Four cases have 
been decided until today (WT/DS18 – Australia-Salmon; WT/DS26, 48 – EC-
Hormones; WT/DS76 – Japan-Agricultural Products; WT/DS245 – Japan-Apples). A 
fifth one, the case on EC measures affecting the marketing of biotech products 
(WT/DS291-293), is still underway at the time of writing.16 
Subject of our analysis is the interpretation that the dispute settlement bodies (with 
an emphasis on the Appellate Body) undertake concerning provisions and aspects of the 
agreement that are related to the precautionary principle and/or precautionary measures 
taken by WTO Members. We start with an analysis of Art. 5:7, which is – according to 
a common reading (Eggers 2001:5; Pardo Quintillán 1999:155) – the precautionary 
norm in the SPS Agreement, and afterwards proceed to look at other relevant aspects of 
the Agreement.17  
                                                 
16  The contents of the SPS Agreement and the factual background of most of these cases have been described else-
where at considerable length – see for overviews of the SPS Agreement and the case law Iynedjian (2002), 
Landwehr (2000), Pauwelyn (2000) and Christoforou (2000). Studies on individual cases include: on the Hor-
mones case Eggers (1998), Godt (1998), Goh and Ziegler (1998), McNiel (1998) and Neugebauer (2000); on the 
Salmon case Taylor (2000) and Thomson (2002); on the Agricultural Products case Whitlock (2002). The Apples 
case does not seem to have received much scholarly attention yet.  
17  Other analyses of the role of the precautionary principle under the SPS Agreement are Bohanes (2002), Eggers 
(2001), Hey (2000) and Scott and Vos (2002) 
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3.1.1 Art. 5:7 SPS Agreement 
The dispute settlement bodies have found four requirements in Art. 5:7 that must be 
fulfilled cumulatively for justifying a measure under Art. 5:7.18 The measure must be 
(1) imposed with respect to a situation where relevant scientific information is in-
sufficient and 
(2) adopted on the basis of available pertinent information. 
Furthermore, the WTO Member in question must 
(3) seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective as-
sessment of the risk and 
(4) review the measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time.   
Until now, no country has ever successfully deployed Art. 5:7 for justifying a – provi-
sional – SPS measure.19 In both cases in which the interpretation of Art. 5:7 was at is-
sue, Japan-Apples and Japan-Agricultural Products, the WTO adjudicators decided 
against the defendant.  
Art. 5:7 is categorised by the adjudicators as a “qualified exemption”20 from what 
could be called the science disciplines of the SPS Agreement.21 More interesting than 
the overall character of Art. 5:7, however, is the way the different elements of Art. 5:7 
are to be interpreted. A troubling point concerning the first of the four above-mentioned 
requirements is which are legitimate reasons for the insufficiency of scientific evidence 
under Art. 5:7. Theoretically at least two possible reasons are conceivable: A first pos-
sible reason (1) could be that simply no scientist has yet investigated the issue in ques-
tion and thus data are not available, but could, in theory, be produced. A second reason 
(2) could be that there is no scientific evidence, because it is, given a certain state of 
science, impossible to produce such evidence on a certain matter, either at all or with 
satisfactory reliability. The categorisation is, of course, an analytical one. In practice 
                                                 
18  WT/DS76/R, para. 8.54; WT/DS245/AB/R, para. 176.  
19  The defendants have not invoked Art. 5:7 in all cases in which they potentially could have done so, though. For 
example, the EC in the Hormones case held the view that its hormone ban was not a temporary measure and 
hence did not want to rely on Art. 5:7; see WT/DS26/R/USA, paras. 4.239, 8.249. 
20  See WT/DS76/AB/R, para. 80. It is not entirely clear what legal consequences result from qualifying a norm as 
“exemption” rather than “exception”. Most likely the consequences are procedural in nature. According to Eggers 
(2001: 164-168), an exemption in contrast to an exception does not have to be invoked by the defending party for 
a Panel to base its findings on the norm.  
21  Both Art. 2:2 and 5:1-5:3 SPS deal with scientific justifications for SPS measures. As Art. 5:7 is directly referred 
to in Art. 2:2, it is primarily an exception to this norm. As Art. 5:1-5:3 can be seen as spelling out more in detail 
the scientific evidence requirement of Art. 2:2 it must also be conceived of as an exemption (to stick with the dis-
pute settlement’s terminology) to those norms.  
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one will frequently not be able to unequivocally attribute the lack of scientific evidence 
to either of the two reasons.  
The only case where the first requirement of Art. 5:7 was directly at stake is the Ap-
ples case. In this case, Japan had contended during the appeal proceedings that Art. 5:7 
covered situations of “unresolved uncertainty”.22 By this term, Japan meant an uncer-
tainty that science was not able to resolve, despite accumulated scientific evidence.23 It 
thus relied on reason (2). The Appellate Body rejected this argumentation.24 Instead the 
Appellate Body clearly distinguished a situation of “scientific uncertainty” from one of 
“insufficiency of relevant scientific evidence.” Art. 5:7 only covers the latter one,25 i.e., 
situations of type (1). This seems a clear enough dictum. The Appellate Body, however, 
then added in ambiguity by saying that insufficiency does not necessarily mean the ab-
sence of evidence, but it could also mean that available evidence is not reliable. 26 Thus, 
like the unsuccessful Japanese defendants, it used reason (2). It is therefore a task for 
the Appellate Body in future cases to clarify its standpoint. In order to arrive at its con-
clusions the Appellate Body relied on a textual method of interpretation, highlighting 
that Art. 5:7 did not speak of “scientific uncertainty”, but rather of insufficient scientific 
evidence.27 
The second of the four conditions in Art. 5:7 has not played a major role in any of the 
cases so far. The third and fourth conditions in Art. 5:7 – regarding the need to seek 
additional information and to review the measure, respectively – were discussed in the 
Agricultural Products case. In this case, the defending party – once again, Japan – had 
itself not claimed to actively have sought additional information, but still the Panel em-
phasised that this could be done relatively easily.28 Moreover, the Panel stated that a 
certain question on which the defending party claimed a lack of sufficient evidence had 
been at issue for 20 years, which it did not consider a reasonable period of time.29 The 
Appellate Body supported this view of the Panel and said that what constituted a rea-
sonable period of time depended on how easy it was to collect the additional informa-
tion necessary for a review.30 The reasonableness of a period of time might thus, it 
                                                 
22  WT/DS245/AB/R, paras. 33, 34. 
23  This the way the AB understood the concept in WT/DS245/AB/R, para. 183. 
24  WT/DS245/AB/R, para. 184. 
25  WT/DS245/AB/R, para. 184. 
26  WT/DS245/AB/R, para. 185, italics in the original text. 
27  WT/DS245/AB/R, para. 184.  
28  WT/DS76/R, para. 8.58. 
29  WT/DS76/R, para. 8.57. 
30  WT/DS76/AB/R, para. 93. 
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seems, be determined both in terms of an absolute time limit (“20 years is too long”) 
and in relation to the difficulties the scientific research process meets with. As the term 
“reasonable” is an indeterminate term which demands the exercise of judgement by the 
adjudicators about the interests and rights at stake in the concrete case, it does not come 
as a surprise that the Appellate Body did not come to grips with this term by means of 
textual interpretation. Rather, it emphasised the malleability of the requirement in rela-
tion to the circumstances of individual cases. It established a kind of “the easier evi-
dence is to find, the shorter the reasonable period” rule which can be conceived of a as a 
kind of balancing of the relevant interests at stake.  
3.1.2 Other elements 
Whether – and if so, how far – the significance of the precautionary principle reaches 
beyond Art. 5:7 under the SPS Agreement is not entirely clear. Dispute settlement pro-
ceedings deal with three interpretive aspects that have a bearing on what precautionary 
measures WTO Members might take under the SPS Agreement. The first concerns the 
status of the precautionary principle in international law and what legal consequences it 
might have for the interpretation of the SPS Agreement. The two further aspects were 
recognised by the Appellate Body as being reflections of the precautionary principle in 
the SPS Agreement: the right of WTO Members to choose for themselves an “appropri-
ate level of protection” , and the way science and scientific evidence are conceptualised 
under the SPS Agreement.31 We discuss each aspect in turn. 
Status and scope of the precautionary principle  
The status and scope of the precautionary principle and its significance for the interpre-
tation of the SPS Agreement were brought to the dispute settlement agenda by the EC in 
the Hormones case.32 The Appellate Body in this case refused to state – as the EC had 
claimed – that the precautionary principle was a general principle of international law 
and could thus guide the Members’ risk assessment under Art. 5:1. At the same time, in 
an exercise of judicial self-restraint the Appellate Body made clear that it considered it 
neither prudent nor necessary to make such a statement about the status of the precau-
tionary principle in international law.33 It found that whatever the status of the precau-
tionary principle in international law was, the principle could not override the explicit 
                                                 
31 See WT/DS/26, 48/AB/R, para. 124.  
32  WT/DS245/R, para. 5.34. 
33  The paragraph is remarkable, both because the Appellate Body makes it very explicit that it considers this move 
an issue of wisdom (rather than considering itself not competent for making a finding on the subject) and also be-
cause it is one of the very rare moments where the Appellate Body cites legal scholarship in a footnote 
(WT/DS26,48/AB/R, para. 123). 
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obligations contained in the SPS Agreement,34 and it could not be used to justify meas-
ures otherwise inconsistent with the Agreement.35 It can be doubted, however, whether 
this finding is as common-sensical an interpretation as the Appellate Body makes it look 
like. As far as the cited findings are an application of the rule that general principles of 
international law do not nullify treaty provisions unless they constitute ius cogens,36 
they are convincing. Whether the principle would overrule the explicit wording of a 
treaty norm, is, however, not the most troubling question.37  
More interesting a point is whether the precautionary principle could provide guid-
ance for the interpretation of norms which remain underdetermined in the SPS Agree-
ment. If the Appellate Body had wished to use the principle as a tool to this end, it could 
have drawn on Art. 31:3 (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). 
This norm mandates that in the interpretation of a treaty any relevant rules of interna-
tional law applicable in the relations between the parties shall be taken into account. A 
principle of international law might be one example of such law applicable in the rela-
tions between the parties.38 The Appellate Body, however, does not follow this ap-
proach. One conceivable reason for the Appellate Body’s refusal to use this option 
would be that the Appellate Body, contrary to what it stated explicitly, implicitly did 
make a decision that the precautionary principle was not a general principle of interna-
tional law. Such a kind of self-contradictory interpretation should, however, not be 
lightly assumed. The alternative would be that the Appellate Body does not think that 
the norms of the SPS Agreement offer enough terminological indeterminacy for making 
use of the precautionary principle, or at least not a kind of indeterminacy which might 
be filled with the help of the precautionary principle. In sum, the Appellate Body nei-
ther awards the precautionary principle the status of a legally binding principle of inter-
national law (1) nor does it hold it to be relevant in the interpretation of the norms of the 
SPS Agreement (2). Whether (2) is a sequitur of (1) is, however, less clear.  
A ramification of the Appellate Body’s position on the lack of relevance of the prin-
ciple is that it does not elaborate on the scope of applicability and its relation with risk 
assessment and risk management. There is, however, an additional reason for which the 
                                                 
34  WT/DS26,48/AB/R, para. 125. 
35  WT/DS26, 48/AB/R, para. 124. 
36  E contrario, this can be inferred from Art. 53 VCLT (see also Brownlie 2003:4; Shaw 1991: 851).  
37  Although there seem to be differing views about this, too. McGinnis (2003) puts forward normative arguments 
for why treaty provisions should be superior in general to customary international law, criticising Pauwelyn 
(2001). 
38  Marceau and Trachtmann (2002: 849); see also Woolcock (2002: 22) for the interpretative function of general 
principles of international law.  
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Appellate Body cannot talk about the applicability of the principle to either risk assess-
ment or risk management. The Appellate Body has rejected the proposition that the 
common risk assessment/risk management divorce can be found in the SPS Agree-
ment39. It found no textual reference to risk management in the legal text and thus fa-
cially rejects any such distinction. Whether this is also a rejection of the idea that a risk 
regulation process might be divided into different phases, each one guided by a different 
rationality, is less clear.40 In any event, from the Appellate Body’s stance follows with a 
compelling logic the formal restriction of the precautionary principle to the realm of risk 
assessment.  
 The right to choose the appropriate level of protection (ALOP) 
The right of WTO Members to choose the appropriate level of protection as they wish is 
in the eyes of the Appellate Body an aspect of precaution to be found in the SPS Agree-
ment.41 This right would indeed amount to something like a green card for applying pre-
cautionary measures, if it could be exercised without further qualification or limits. In 
this case, a Member could set a level of protection at zero risk even where scientific 
uncertainties concerning causality and/or the magnitude of the risk existed. Taking into 
account that the precautionary principle permits or prescribes action where uncertainty 
about the occurrence of a damage prevails, this would clearly be a precautionary ap-
proach.42  
Under the SPS Agreement things are, however, more complicated. The reason for 
this is that while choosing a level of protection is indeed a prerogative of WTO Mem-
bers under the SPS Agreement, and their choices are not subject to judicial review, this 
is not true for the measures taken to reach this level of protection. The latter are subject 
to both the “science disciplines” in Art. 2:2, 5:1 and the “trade disciplines” in Art. 2:3, 
5:5, 5:6. Although this might not put de jure limits to the right of Members to choose 
their appropriate level of protection, it clearly does restrict their options as to what mea-
sures they take to reach this level of protection. As taking measures is, however, what 
counts in a regulatory context, the right to choose a level of protection is not all too big 
an asset if not accompanied by a right to decide about the regulatory measures to be 
taken. In other words, while it might be true that Members have a right to choose their 
level of protection under the SPS Agreement and this is an aspect of precaution, they do 
                                                 
39  WT/DS26, 48/AB/R, para. 181. 
40  Many authors do assume that, in substance, the risk assessment/risk management separation is present in the SPS 
Agreement, too (see Bohanes 2002: 339; Landwehr 2000: 67; Nunn, in Robertson and Kellow 2001: 96; Walker 
2003: 226). 
41  WT/DS26, 48/AB/R, para. 124.  
42  This point was in fact made by Japan in WT/DS246/AB/R, para. 36, albeit in the context of Art. 5:7. 
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not gain much from this as long as they are not entitled to also choose measures to prac-
tically secure that this level is reached.  
To elaborate somewhat on this controversial point: It is a problematic assumption, in 
a regulatory context, that the right to choose a level of protection is separable from the 
measures taken to attain it. Let us compare the above formulated proposition  
(1) “We exercise our right to choose a level of protection by setting the level of 
protection at x and hence we will take measure y.”  
with a second one, formulated to the same end: 
(2) “We choose level of protection x. X is the level of protection we reach by tak-
ing measure y.”  
In the second proposition the level of protection x is inextricably linked to the measure 
y taken. Whereas proposition (2) is evidently perfectly possible from a strictly logical 
point of view, the important question in our context is whether any country would want 
to use it in its formulation of an ALOP. We are inclined to answer this question in the 
positive, especially in cases where a zero-risk level is the objective. Although this point 
might need further reflection and elaboration, we contend that the following statement is 
a meaningful one which real-world political actors might thus actually make: “We want 
to absolutely protect our population against the dangers arising from the use of sub-
stance A. Absolute protection means for us that we do want to exclude any damage, 
even the smallest one, resulting from the use of A. This absolute protection is precisely 
the protection that we reach when completely banning the use and imports of A.” There 
are, in other words, very likely situations in which a complete prohibition of a certain 
substance or practice plus effective enforcement is the only way of reaching the desired 
level of protection. In such cases, not being allowed to take the “one and only” measure 
implies at the same time not being able to choose the level of protection.43  
What does all this mean for the idea that the right to set an appropriate level of pro-
tection is an aspect of precaution? Our thesis is that while it is theoretically possible to 
make this point, its practical relevance is very limited – due to the fact that right to 
choose a level of protection is itself a right from which WTO Members do not profit 
                                                 
43  One might, and with due reason so, argue that in such a situation the SPS Agreement as interpreted by the dispute 
settlement bodies would not prevent a country from taking “the one and only” measure. The ruling of the AB in 
the Asbestos case that the “safe use” propagated by Canada was not a feasible alternative to a ban is as indicative 
of this as its finding in the Hormones case that the risks to be taken into account in a risk assessment may include 
risks arising from the real-world handling of a substance. Whether a measure is permissible does, however, not 
depend on the right of Members to choose a level of protection, but on the interpretation of the specific provisions 
(to which the “rhetoric” of the ALOP does not contribute). It is this rhetoric that we argue against as somehow 
misleading, not the outcome of conrete cases.  
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 18) 
- 16 - 
much in the end. Thus, it could be said that although it is uncontroversial between the 
WTO adjudicators and the Members that Members have a right to choose their level of 
protection and this an aspect of precaution, not much is gained from this in the end in 
terms of precaution. 
 Concept and role of science and scientific evidence 
A final point of relevance to our discussion in this section is the conceptualisation of 
science and scientific evidence by the WTO adjudicators. How does this question relate 
to the precautionary principle? One of the basic conditions for applying the precaution-
ary principle is the existence of scientific uncertainty. Now if a norm makes science the 
yardstick for certain regulatory measures, the way science is understood makes of cour-
se a giant difference. If one has a notion of science or of a scientific process as necessar-
ily entailing a certain degree of uncertainty, the precautionary principle will turn into 
something like an eternal companion to any norm that makes science a decisive crite-
rion. On the other hand, if one assumes the regular scientific case to be one where cer-
tainty prevails and clear-cut conclusions can be made, there is less room (or necessity) 
for a precautionary principle. This point is reflected in the dispute settlement cases, al-
though science itself is hardly a topic. The issue is mainly dealt with in procedural 
terms, i.e. with regard to the question what scientific evidence is sufficient to warrant a 
finding by the adjudicators that a measure complies with the science disciplines of the 
SPS Agreement. 
Two sub-aspects might be distinguished. First, the Appellate Body acknowledges 
that what standards are applied to the scientific evidence submitted is an aspect of pre-
caution. It stated that when reviewing Members’ SPS measures and the evidence put 
forward to support them, Panels “should bear in mind that responsible, representative 
governments commonly act from perspectives of prudence and precaution where risk of 
irreversible, e.g. life-terminating, damage to human health are concerned.”44 The mes-
sage is that in cases of grave potential damage, Panels are to content themselves with 
less evidence (in a qualitative or quantitative sense) for holding a Member’s SPS meas-
ure to be consistent with WTO law. This implies that a lower degree of certainty is suf-
ficient before measures might be taken. Similarly to what was observed above concern-
ing the term “reasonable” in Art. 5.7 SPS, the Appellate Body interprets here the term 
“sufficient” in Art. 5.1 SPS as involving a “the more serious the risk, the less evidence 
is required” rule. Once more, this constitutes a kind of balancing-of-interests approach – 
probably owed again to the open and “evaluative” character of the treaty term to be in-
terpreted.  
                                                 
44  WT/DS26, 48/AB/R, para. 124. 
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Second, the Appellate Body is apparently of the view that science does not always 
come to monolithic conclusions and that different methods might be used to arrive at 
valid results. Thus in the context of the interpretation of Art. 5:1 SPS, the Appellate 
Body found that a measure could still be “based on” a risk assessment if its base is only 
a minority scientific view.45 Again, this implies a lowering of the degree of scientific 
certainty that needs to exist before a measure can be enacted, and hence an element of 
precaution (Eggers 2001: 188). The Appellate Body also accepts that scientific investi-
gation might have to take place beyond the narrow confines of a laboratory46 and that it 
might express its result in both quantitative and qualitative ways.47 Altogether, then, the 
Appellate Body’s findings reflect rather broad, “sociologically” informed concepts of 
science and scientific evidence. 
3.2 WTO Committees 
Now we leave the judicial stage of the WTO and move to the political arena. The short-
est formulation for reporting what happened in the WTO committees with regard to the 
precautionary principle would probably be a plain “nothing”. The single most important 
move with regard to the precautionary principle came from the EC: In 2000, it submit-
ted both the European Commission’s Communication on the Application of the Precau-
tionary Principle (in the following: the Communication)48 and the Resolution on the Use 
of the Precautionary Principle of the December 2000 Nice European Council (hence-
forth: the Resolution)49 to the SPS50 and TBT51 Committees and the CTE.52 In the CTE, 
the issue was debated as part of the negotiations on “item 2”, concerning the relation-
ship between environmental policies relevant to trade and environmental measures with 
                                                 
45  WT/DS26, 48/AB/R, para. 194.  
46  WT/DS/26, 48/AB/R, paras. 205, 206.  
47  WT/DS18/AB/R, para. 124. 
48  KOM (2000) 1 final. For an overviews of the Communication’s contents see McNelis (2000). Further commen-
tary and analysis is provided by Priess and Pitschas (2000), Majone (2002), Woolcock (2002) and Daemen 
(2003). 
49  Annex II of Presidency Conclusions of the Nice European Council Meeting, 7, 8 and 9 December 2000 (No. 
400/1/00). The European Parliament also dealt with the Communication, endorsing its overall thrust but in sev-
eral instances going beyond what the Commission – or, for that matter, the Council – stated (Report A5-
0352/2000, 23 November 2000). Reflecting the limited influence of the Parliament in external trade policy, its re-
port was not officially considered in any of the WTO fora and is hence neglected in our analysis. 
50  The Communication as G/SPS/GEN/168 and the Resolution as G/SPS/GEN/225. 
51  The Communication as G/TBT/W/147 and the Resolution as G/TBT/W/154. 
52  The Communication as WT/CTE/W/147 and the Resolution as WT/CTE/W/181.  
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significant trade effects and the provision of the multilateral trading system.53 In the SPS 
Committee, the EC submissions came under the heading of “Implementation of the 
Agreement”54, whereas in the TBT Committee they came simply under “Other Busi-
ness”.55  
The objective of both EC documents is to clarify internally the manner of application 
of the precautionary principle by the Commission, but also to contribute to the interna-
tional debate externally.56 Both documents were – in the words of EC representatives – 
introduced to the WTO Committees to dispel fears about the use of the precautionary 
principle as a tool for protectionism.57 They both use the same strategy of clarifying on 
the one hand the way the precautionary principle is applied within the Community, 
drawing thus attention to the internal legal obligations that bind the Community organs. 
At the same time they suggest certain interpretations of WTO law, aiming at keeping 
open regulatory space for WTO Members (read: the EC itself). The EC also made it 
clear that it saw precaution as a possible item for future negotiations within the WTO.  
Altogether both documents did not receive too warm a welcome from the other WTO 
Members, although (partial) support was voiced by some countries.58 Most Members, 
however, took a rather critical stance, for a variety of reasons.59 One bone of contention 
was the alleged status of the precautionary principle as customary and cross-sectoral 
principle of international law. Several Members objected and pointed out that the prin-
ciple had not reached this status yet and, if at all, needed to be formulated and applied in 
                                                 
53  See WT/CTE/M/24, paras. 78-87; WT/CTE/M/26, para. 59-89 and also WT/CTE/INF/5/Rev. 3. 
54  See G/SPS/R/18. 
55  See G/TBT/M/21; G/TBT/M/23, paras. 129-140. 
56  Communication, p. 6.  
57  See WT/CTE/M/26, para. 59; G/SPS/R/18, para. 2; G/TBT/M/21, para. 84.  
58  See the comments of Switzerland in G/SPS/R/21, para. 89, Norway in WT/CTE/M26, para. 69. Other countries 
verbally confirmed that they shared some common ground with the EC on precaution, but in substance raised ob-
jections so serious that these affirmations would rather appear to be some kind of lip-service or diplomatic cour-
tesy. See comments of the US in WT/CTE/M/26, para. 75, of Australia, of Canada in G/TBT/M/21, para. 86. 
59  In addition to the conflicting views on certain aspects described in this section, a further point of dissent was the 
appropriate forum for discussing the issue. Regarding the TBT Committee, e.g., several Members did not think 
that the matter belonged on its agenda, see the comments made by Australia in G/TBT/M/24, para. 117; Chile in 
G/TBT/M/23, the US in G/TBT/M/23, para. 133; India in G/TBT/M/21, para. 87. Moreover, it should be noted 
that the issued was also framed/perceived by many Members as point of conflict between developed/developing 
countries, see Argentina in G/SPS/R/18, para. 10; Cameroon in G/SPS/R/19, para. 39. Concerns were voiced that 
the application of the precautionary principle would make it even harder for developing countries to access de-
veloped countries’ markets. 
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a sector-specific way.60 As to the role of science in decision-making, some countries 
shared the EC’s approach that the precautionary principle belonged to the realm of risk 
management where decisions had to be taken in the light of scientific uncertainty.61 O-
ther Members felt less at ease with this conception, stressing that decision-making had 
to be science-based (as laid down in the SPS Agreement), and warned not to use the 
precautionary principle as a tool for loosening the tie between science and the regula-
tory measures taken.62  
Several Members also seemed concerned with what purpose the EC pursued with its 
submissions. They rejected what they saw as an attempt to alter the negotiated balance 
of the rights and obligations of the Members as well as trade and non-trade concerns set 
forth in the various agreements. Elements of precaution already inherent to the existing 
provisions were thus emphasised.63 Altogether, the EC’s input did not trigger any major 
discussions on the issue. Not surprisingly, it did not result in any concrete policy out-
come, either.  
The issue of precaution was also discussed in other WTO fora, related to the agricul-
tural negotiations. The protocols of the Committee on Agriculture contain several refer-
ences to precaution. Some deal of disagreement existed apparently about whether the 
issue should be at the hands of the Agriculture Committee or fell rather under the man-
date of the SPS Committee.64 In debates of the Trade Negotiations Committee several 
countries spoke in favour of progress in the agriculture negotiations and made it clear 
that they did not want debates about precaution to delay such progress. The feeling 
seems to have been that some countries used the issue unduly as a bargaining chip for 
the anyway intricate negotiations.65 
                                                 
60  Argentina in G/SPS/R/18, para. 10 and WT/CTE/M/26, para. 82; Hong Kong, China in WT/CTE/M/24, para. 85; 
India and Egypt in G/TBT/M/21, paras. 89 and 92; Mexico in G/SPS/R/18, para. 11; the US in WT/CTE/M26, 
para. 75; WT/CTE/M/24, para. 82 and G/TBT/M/23, para. 133. 
61  Switzerland in WT/CTE/M/26, para. 84 and Norway in para. 69 of the same document. 
62  Australia in G/TBT/M/24, para. 117 and WT/CTE/M/24, para. 81; Hong Kong, China in WT/CTE/M/24, para. 
85. 
63  Australia in G/SPS/R/18, para. 4 and WT/CTE/M/26, para. 67; Bolivia in G/SPS/R/18, para. 7; Brazil in 
WT/CTE/M/26, para. 68 and G/TBT/M/23, para. 134; Canada in G/TBT/M/24, para. 115; Malaysia in 
WT/CTE/M/26, para. 80.  
64  See TN/AG/6, para. 28, a report which met with a considerable amount of criticism for including precaution 
among the debated issues, see Brazil in TN/AG/R/9, para. 25 and TN/C/M/11 as well as Australia in, Annex 2, p. 
17 of the same document.  
65  See Australia in TN/C/M/3, para. 152 and Peru in TN/C/M/4, para. 17. 
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3.3 Codex Alimentarius – Committee on General Principles 
The next forum which we look at is the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC). As we 
have stated above, the CAC is an example of a forum which is formally related to the 
WTO: The non-binding CAC standards do not form part of the WTO legal order di-
rectly. They are, however, incorporated into WTO law by virtue of Art. 3:2 of the SPS 
Agreement and Art. 2:4 of the TBT Agreement. Neither of those norms makes the CAC 
standards binding for the WTO Members, but both stipulate basically that WTO Mem-
bers wishing to deviate from those standards need to justify such deviation. Whether a 
Member has or has not complied with this obligation is a matter open to review by the 
dispute settlement bodies. According to Art. 3:2 SPS, a national food-safety measure is 
presumed to be consistent with WTO law if it conforms to the CAC standards. A Mem-
ber wishing to deviate from standards needs to justify this and fulfil additional require-
ments (Art. 3:3 and 5 SPS). These additional requirements, however, also must be ful-
filled in cases where no relevant international standards exist. The function of the pre-
sumption in Art. 3:2 SPS is thus clearly to make it easier for WTO Members to justify 
SPS measures conforming to international standards in the light of WTO law. The situa-
tion where no international standard exists and the situation where a WTO Member 
does not enact its measures in conformity with these standards are, however, treated 
identically before WTO law (see also Iynedjian 2002: 70, 77). Thus, it could be said 
that the philosophy of the SPS Agreement is one of rewarding the good children, not of 
punishing the trouble-making kids by making deviations from the CAC standards extra-
hard (see alsoPauwelyn 1999: 656).  
This is, however, only one of the aspects of the relationship between WTO law and 
the Codex. Next to rewarding countries that design their SPS measures in conformity 
with the Codex standards, the SPS Agreement also obliges WTO Members in Art. 5:1 
to take into account risk assessment techniques developed by the CAC when conducting 
food safety assessments. Thus, the development of risk assessment techniques allowing 
to apply precaution within risk assessment would also open a venue for WTO Members 
to exert precaution when taking measures that restrict the import of certain foodstuffs 
(on the relation of the precautionary principle to risk assessment see more specifically 
below, p. 35).  
In our analysis of the Codex negotiations, we focus on the elaboration of Working 
Principles for Risk Analysis for Food Safety (in the following: the Principles).66 There 
are two reasons for choosing precisely this text: the Principles are of importance in the 
development of Codex standards in general, and the issue of precaution was particularly 
                                                 
66  Issues with relevance for precaution were also discussed in other Codex bodies, such as the Committee on Food 
Hygiene and the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Food Derived from Biotechnology.  
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relevant for their development. The purpose of the Principles is to streamline the risk 
analysis process which takes place before a new Codex standard is agreed upon. The 
Principles are composed of sections on general aspects of risk analysis, risk assessment 
policy, risk assessment, risk management and risk communication. Each section con-
tains guidelines of a more or less general nature for the respective stage of the risk ana-
lysis process.  
We will on the next pages look at the negotiating process from the 22nd session of the 
Commission in 1997, where this text was debated for the first time, until its 26th session 
in 2003, where the Draft Principles were adopted for inclusion in the Procedural Man-
ual, focussing on several controversial issues surrounding precaution which arose 
throughout this process. We will describe the main arguments brought forward and how 
the issue was settled.67 Many issues were contested and, of course, opinions diverged on 
formulations but we will concentrate only on those problems, and their fate in the cour-
se of the negotiating process, that are closely related to the precautionary principle. We 
will also restrict the reproduction of comments to those made by governments and ex-
clude those of NGOs and other international organisations, so as to secure comparability 
with the other fora where mainly countries’ representatives are entitled to submit com-
ments.  
3.3.1 To refer or not to refer to the precautionary principle 
The first controversial issue was whether a reference to the precautionary principle 
should be included into the Principles. Proponents of a reference to the precautionary 
principle argued that the inclusion of such a reference would augment consumers’ trust 
in risk analysis68 and also make clear that health protection was the primary objective of 
the CAC.69 They also stressed that uncertainty was inherent to risk assessments, and 
                                                 
67  The analysis is based on the reports of the sessions of different CAC bodies, mostly the Committee on General 
Principles (CCGP) and preparatory documents such as drafts proposed by the Secretariat. Only from the 15th ses-
sion of the CCGP (2000) onwards more extensive documentation is available from the Codex Website. For the 
14th session some documents beside the report of the session can be obtained from ftp://ftp.fao.org. For the ses-
sions before these only the reports of the sessions are available. When the CAC Secretariat prepares a document, 
it must, of course take into account the mandate given to it by a Committee or the Commission and the views that 
were given by Members and observes in written or orally. Still, at least some documents (e. g., CX/GP 00/3) 
leave the reader with the impression that the Secretariat enjoys quite a degree of autonomy when drafting and is 
willing to use it. It also sometimes takes the floor during sessions for giving its view on certain issues.  
68  ALINORM 01/33A, para. 61. 
69  See ALINORM 99/33A, para. 29; ALINORM 01/33, para. 49. 
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principles on risk analysis thus had to address these uncertainties anyhow.70 A reference 
to the precautionary principle/approach was seen as the standard formulation for cases 
of uncertainty which consequently should also be used in Codex to avoid parallel termi-
nologies and hence confusion.71 The opponents of a reference to the precautionary prin-
ciple voiced concern over the lack of clarity on the scope and content of the principle, 
especially in the area of food safety.72 This might, as some worried, allow countries to 
use the precautionary principle to cause obstacles to trade and to deviate from their ob-
ligations under WTO law.73 It was also feared that including reference to the precaution-
ary principle might be a device for risk managers not to base their decisions on scien-
tific risk assessments.74 It is interesting that the rhetoric battle is not fought mainly along 
the lines of the legal status of the principle, an issue which is seldom touched upon.75 
Still, the approach/principle controversy also played a certain role.  
In the first available draft,76 a reference to precaution was contained in the section on 
general aspects.77 This reference was maintained throughout the process and in the ver-
sion included in the procedural manual.78 It seems that a formulation as general as this 
one (without reference to a “principle”) was something that all countries could live with.  
3.3.2 Risk management and precaution  
More controversial was a reference to the precautionary principle (or a precautionary 
approach) in the section on risk management. The debate has two interwoven strands: 
First, there is again the terminological problem of whether the precautionary principle 
should be recognised as principle and included as such into the text. This debate is re-
lated to a more substantive aspect: Several countries seem to have been anxious that 
including a reference to precaution/the precautionary principle/a precautionary approach 
                                                 
70  One of the most common principles for addressing situations of scientific uncertainty is the precautionary princi-
ple, but of course those situations might be resolved without explicit reference to precaution, albeit following the 
logic of precaution. See for the argument ALINORM 01/33, para. 48. 
71  See the comment by Norway in CX/GP 00/3-Add. 1, p. 9. 
72  See ALINORM 99/33, para. 20; ALINORM 99/33A, paras. 32, 33; ALINORM 01/33, para. 47. 
73  ALINORM 01/33A, paras. 61, 66. 
74  See ALINORM 99/33A, para. 30.  
75  One exception is ALINORM 01/33A, para. 61. From this paragraph it becomes clear, however, that for some 
countries favouring the inclusion of a reference, the inclusion itself seem to have been the important point, not the 
exact formulation as “principle” or “approach”.  
76  CX/GP 00/3.  
77  Para. 5 reads: „The situations where scientific evidence is insufficient or negative effects are difficult to evaluate 
should be clearly identified, in order to ensure that adequate precaution is integrated in the risk analysis process.“ 
78  See para. 11. The formulation here is different from the initial one, but the reference to precaution still exists.  
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in risk management would make the whole risk-analysis process less science-oriented, 
loosening the ties between risk assessment and risk management. The question was, 
thus, how closely risk managers were to be bound to the result of a risk assessment pro-
cess. Should they enjoy some extra-margin of discretion, deduced from the precaution-
ary principle, for taking into account non-scientific factors (which could be reached 
through the precautionary principle)? Should mention of situations of scientific uncer-
tainty be made at all in the Principles? 
The first draft available contains only a bracketed reference to the “precautionary 
principle/ a precautionary approach” in the section on risk management, as no consen-
sus had been reached in the prior session.79 During the 14th CCGP session, the EC and 
some of its Member States underlined the need to address situations of insufficient sci-
entific evidence in the section on risk management.80 This was, however, contentious 
right away. During the 15th session two alternative versions were formulated, one of 
them referring to “precaution” only, the other one referring in a footnote to the precau-
tionary principle.81 The working group established for dealing with the issue in prepara-
tion for the next session agreed on one version that contained both a reference to pre-
caution in the main text and the footnote, but marked it an open question whether this 
footnote should be deleted.82 During the 16th session a major discussion took place.83 In 
the end different versions were kept in the text84 and it was decided to seek the advice of 
the Commission itself on how the CAC should proceed in cases where the risk assess-
ment revealed scientific uncertainty on a certain matter.85  
The Commission during its 24th session took a decision on this point86 and at the sa-
me time restricted the scope of the Principles to application in the Codex framework.87 
This double decision had the effect of bringing the discussion about precaution in risk 
management to an end. The working group commissioned with the preparation of the 
17th session of the CCGP agreed upon a proposal which did not contain any reference to 
precaution or the precautionary principle in either the text or a footnote in the section on 
                                                 
79  CX/GP 00/3, para. 38 of the text and para. 38 of the draft.  
80  ALINORM 99/33A, paras. 27-29. 
81  ALINORM 01/33, Appendix III, paras. 34, 35.  
82  See CX/GP 01/3 and ALINORM 01/33A, para. 54.  
83  ALINORM 01/33A, paras. 32-34, 49-69.  
84  ALINORM 01/33A, Appendix V.  
85  ALINORM 01/33A, para. 72.  
86  See below, next section.  
87  See below, section 3.3.4.  
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risk management.88 In this text and all following drafts,89 the text that the Commission 
had proposed for dealing with scientific uncertainty can be found in the section on gen-
eral principles (para. 10). In the section on risk management the text no longer contains 
any explicit reference to situations of scientific uncertainty or precaution, but para. 10 is 
mentioned in one of the paragraphs as providing guidance to risk managers (para. 29).90 
This situation remained unchanged until the inclusion of the Principles in the Procedural 
Manual.  
3.3.3 Behaviour of the Codex in cases of insufficient evidence 
A sub-aspect of the debate on precaution in risk management is the question whether 
Codex bodies should develop standards in situations of insufficient scientific evidence. 
To understand the different positions, it is important to recall that the function of a Co-
dex standard under WTO law is to facilitate matters for governments wishing to take 
SPS measures.91 Proponents of the idea that Codex should not elaborate any standards in 
cases of insufficient scientific evidence argued that global standards like the CAC stan-
dards should not be taken without an adequate scientific basis. Governments could act 
as second line of defence and still take necessary actions in the light of scientific uncer-
tainty.92 It was also pointed out that measures of only a provisional measure were not to 
be taken at Codex level which would also speak against any action at all with scientific 
uncertainty still present.93  
The question seems to have come up for the first time during the 14th session of the 
CCGP. During this session France proposed that if the precautionary principle was not 
mentioned in the section on risk management, it should be set forth in the alternative 
that Codex should not adopt standards or other texts in cases of scientific uncertainty.94 
Until the 16th session of the CCGP the point was not debated as a separate issue; rather 
precaution in risk management in general was the topic. Only during the 16th session it 
emerged again.95 The Committee decided in view of remaining disagreement to request 
the help of the Commission.96 During its 24th session the Commission agreed on the 
                                                 
88  CX/GP 02/3. 
89  ALINORM 03/33, Appendix II; ALINORM 03/33A, Appendix IV.  
90  ALINORM 03/33 Appendix II and ALINORM 03/33 A, Appendix IV, para. 29. 
91  See above, first paragraph of section 3.3. 
92  See the comment by Uruguay in ALINORM 01/33, para. 52; the comments of the US in CX/GP 00/3-Add. 5, p. 
2. 
93  See CX/GP 01/3-Add. 2, p. 9. 
94  ALINORM 99/33A, para. 31. 
95  See ALINORM 01/33A, paras. 62, 69.  
96  ALINORM 01/33A, para. 72. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 18) 
- 25 - 
following clause: “When there is evidence that a risk to human health exists but scien-
tific data are insufficient or incomplete, the Commission should not proceed to elaborate 
a standard but should consider elaborating a related text, such as a code of practice, pro-
vided that such text would be supported by the available scientific evidence.”97 This 
formulation was forthwith included in para. 10 of the Principles – in the section on gen-
eral aspects, not under risk management. 
3.3.4 Scope of the Principles 
A further point for debate during the writing of the Principles was their scope. It was 
unclear whether the Principles were designed for application in the Codex framework 
alone or should also provide guidance to Member governments. For the latter case a 
decision needed to be made whether one version of the Principles was enough or both 
situations were so different that two sets of rules needed to be formulated. The mandate 
given to the CCGP by the 22nd session of the Commission simply requested the elabora-
tion of principles for inclusion in the Procedural Manual; the title of the agenda item 
referred, however, to the application of risk analysis principles in the Codex.98 As the 
later process would show, the mandate was not unambiguous.99  
Advocates of elaborating two sets of Principles mainly pointed out that the situations 
of the Codex and Member governments were different.100 Whereas governments – as 
last resort against health risks – might be compelled to act in order to protect their popu-
lations in certain instances, no such pressure was likely to arise in Codex which could 
always freely decide whether to elaborate a standard or not. It was also said that enlarg-
ing the scope of the principles would diminish prospects for reaching consensus.101 No 
country seems, however, to have rejected categorically the elaboration of standards for 
application by governments.  
Underlying the first available draft is the idea that the Principles will be applicable 
by both the Codex and governments.102 In the CCGP session preceding this draft, the 
need for clarifying this point had already been recognised.103 As the matter could not be 
settled until the 16th session, it was decided by the CCGP in this session to ask the Com-
                                                 
97  ALINORM 01/41, para. 81.  
98  ALINORM 97/37, para. 164. 
99  See for example ALINORM 01/33A, para. 59. 
100  See ALINORM 01/33, para. 53 and CX/GP 00/3, paras. 47, 48. 
101  CX/GP 01/3-Add. 2, pp. 9, 10. 
102  See CX/GP 00/3, Section Scope, para. 1.  
103  ALINORM 99/33, para. 18 and ALINORM 99/33 A, paras. 16, 24. Interestingly the Secretariat was the one to 
stress that the initial mandate given to the CCGP by the Commission only covered the elaboration of Principles 
applicable in the Codex framework, ALINORM 99/33A, para. 24.  
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mission to take the necessary decision.104 The Commission in its 24th session came up 
with the Solomonic resolution that the CCGP should proceed to elaborate principles for 
application in the Codex framework with priority, but subsequently or in parallel work 
on principles offering guidance to governments.105 Consequently, the CCGP split up its 
work process into two separate ones, with the one on the elaboration of Principles on 
risk analysis for application by governments still under way.106  
3.3.5 Concepts of science, precaution and the proper role of science in risk 
analysis 
A final aspect in our analysis of the debate are the diverging concepts of science that are 
reflected in the contributions made by the diverse actors involved in the making of the 
Principles. In contrast to what is true for the first four issues described above, this one 
was not as such a subject of explicit debate. Rather it underlies the different positions 
and only sometimes turns into concrete proposals. The prevailing understanding in the 
Codex negotiations seems to have been that uncertainty frequently occurs during scien-
tific investigation. This is manifest for example in the existence of a section of the Prin-
ciples on risk assessment policy. The idea that it is necessary to set guidelines for scien-
tists on how to proceed in their research process to keep them from taking implicit nor-
mative decisions,107 is starkly at odds with a concept of science according to which 
space for such normative decisions by individual scientists simply does not exist. That 
cases of scientific uncertainty are expected to occur, is also recognised in, among others, 
para. 10 of the Principles.  
Although Codex negotiators thus seemed to be united by a similar overall approach 
towards science, details remained controversial. Two aspects are especially salient: First 
of all, the described controversy about the application of precaution in risk management 
can be understood as a conflict over how much uncertainty is regularly expected to re-
main after a risk assessment was performed, and hence how science-driven the whole 
process of risk analysis should be (see above, p. 22). Specifically, there was a debate 
about whether the whole process of risk analysis should be described as “science-based” 
or whether a reference to science should be included at least into the section on risk ma-
nagement. According to the protocol of the 13th session, several countries were of the 
opinion that the risk analysis process should be based on sound science.108 The lack of 
unequivocal support for this position, however, led during the 15th CCGP session to the 
                                                 
104  ALINORM 01/33A, paras. 24, 71.  
105  ALINORM 01/41, para. 75.  
106  See the Report of the 20th session of the CCGP (2004), ALINORM 04/27/33A, paras. 37-43.  
107  On uncertainty in risk assessments and science policy as a reaction, see Walker (1998: 259-263). 
108  ALINORM 99/33, para. 19. 
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bracketing of the clause that risk analysis should be “soundly based on science” in the 
section on general aspects.109 Equally a proposal made by the US during this session, to 
state that risk management should be grounded on a science-based risk assessment, did 
not gain the necessary support and was thus maintained only in brackets.110 The issue 
was further debated during the 16th session. Consensus was reached that the bracketed 
clause was to be substituted by a reference to the Statement of Principle concerning the 
Role of Science in the Codex Decision-making Process and the Extent to which Other 
Factors are Taken into Account.111 This Statement, which is part of the Procedural Ma-
nual, allows, in principle, the consideration of non-scientific factors in risk management 
while it is stated that this should not undermine the scientific basis of the risk analysis 
process. In the draft that served as preparation for the 17th session also the formulation 
that risk management should be grounded on scientific risk assessment was removed in 
favour of a reference to the Statement of Principle on the Role of Science.112 With this, 
the text took its final shape which can also be found in para. 28 of the Principles in the 
final version included in the Procedural Manual.  
A second question related to different concepts of science was how explicitly and 
how often the text should refer to controversies and dissent as part of science. The pro-
tocol of the 13th session mentions discussion about this point.113 During the 15th session 
it was agreed to insert a reference to the existence of minority opinions.114 This was re-
discussed during the 18th session, but finally the hints to minority opinions in paras. 25 
and 40 were maintained.115 Other text proposals not included in the final version also 
reflect diverging views about what science has to offer in certain knowledge and how 
explicitly this should be recognised in the text. An example is the debate about enumer-
ating different sources of uncertainty (which was finally rejected).116 
3.4 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
We conclude our review of trade-related international debates and the role of precaution 
therein with an analysis of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the first binding inter-
                                                 
109  ALINORM 01/33, para. 15. 
110  ALINORM 01/33, paras. 33, 34 and para. 25 of the Draft Principles in the version from after the 15th session, 
ALINORM 01/33, Appendix III. 
111  ALINORM 01/33A, paras. 27, 28. 
112  Compare para. 32 of CX/GP 02/3, Appendix 2 with para. 25 of ALINORM 01/33, Appendix III.  
113  ALINORM 99/33, para. 22. 
114  ALINORM 01/33, para. 25.  
115  See ALINORM 03/33A, paras. 19, 26.  
116  See CX/GP 02/3, p. 51; ALINORM 03/33A, para. 26. 
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national agreement dealing with genetically modified organisms (GMOs).117 The Con-
vention on Biological Diversity (CBD), to which the Cartagena Protocol is a supple-
mentary agreement, is part of the set of multilateral environmental agreements which 
were adopted at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, the Rio de 
Janeiro “Earth Summit”. In August 2004, the Convention had 188 Parties, including the 
EC as well as all of its current member states.118 The handling and use of GMOs – in 
this context called “living modified organisms” (LMOs)119 – are singled out in the Con-
vention for treatment in a protocol, i.e., a binding international instrument that is sepa-
rate from, but builds upon the Convention.120 Work on a protocol began in the frame-
work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Biosafety (BSWG) in 1996. The role of the 
precautionary principle in the Protocol emerged as one of the main sticking points for 
the first time at the Extraordinary Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the CBD 
(ExCOP) in Cartagena in February 1999 (Falkner 2002; Graff 2002). Not least for this 
reason the Protocol could be adopted only one year later, at the resumed ExCOP meet-
ing in Montreal. Despite efforts by its opponents to persuade CBD Parties not to ratify 
the Protocol (e.g., Bailey 2002: 13; Phillips 2000: 74), it had received the required 
number of 50 ratifications in June 2003 and entered into force ninety days later. In the 
following subsections we take a closer look at individual contested issues concerning 
the precautionary principle and how they were resolved. 
3.4.1 Reference to precaution 
As indicated by the BSWG’s terms of reference, the desirability of some sort of refer-
ence to precaution in the Protocol appears to have been consensual as early as 1995.121 
The formulation there, however, leaves a wide range of possible ways of “taking into 
                                                 
117  Compared to negotiations in the Codex and its subsidiary bodies, the history of the Cartagena Protocol is much 
better documented in various observers’ and participants’ reports (especially in Bail 2002), on which we can thus 
rely throughout most of this section. 
118  The United States, by contrast, is not a party to the CBD due to resistance against its ratification in Congress 
(Phillips 2000: 65). The US had observer status in the negotiations of the Cartagena Protocol but, like other 
GMO-exporting nations such as Canada and Argentina, has not ratified the Protocol either (Falkner 2004). 
119  The term “living modified organism” reflects arguments about the proper scope of a biosafety agreement (see 
below); specifically the USA insisted during CBD negotiations that only the final organism and not the process of 
genetic modification as such could possibly pose a risk to biodiversity (Marquard 2002: 289). 
120  On the origins of the Cartagena Protocol in the CBD and the history of negotiating the Protocol see Cosbey and 
Burgiel (2000), Bail, Falkner, and Marquard (2002), as well as Mackenzie et al. (2003: 1-5). 
121  The terms of reference for the BSWG provided that, inter alia: “The protocol will take into account the principles 
enshrined in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and, in particular, the precautionary approach 
contained in Principle 15” (Decision II/5, UNEP/CBD/COP/2/19, para. v). 
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account” the precautionary principle. Until relatively late in the negotiating process, the 
Parties appear to have cared about this issue much less than about the more specific 
issues discussed below (cf. Graff 2002, also on much of the following). When the ques-
tion of whether – and if so, how – to explicitly anchor the precautionary principle in the 
Protocol finally emerged on the agenda, it was the so-called “Like-minded Group” of 
developing countries that pushed for a strong statement.122 In particular, the Like-
minded Group wanted references to the precautionary principle not only in the preamble 
and the article on objectives, but also in operational provisions relating to decision-
making and risk-assessment procedures (Graff 2002: 412). On the other hand, the “Mi-
ami Group” of grain-exporting countries (Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, the US 
and Uruguay) was not only reluctant to adopt a protocol at all but also opposed any spe-
cial recognition of the precautionary principle, should a protocol be adopted anyway. 
The EC initially took a mediating position between these two groups of countries. Be-
tween the Cartagena and Montreal conferences, however, the EC position appears to 
have developed in the direction of stronger support for the precautionary principle. At 
the end of the day, this position prevailed at least insofar as the Protocol does indeed 
refer to precaution in both its general and its specific parts (see more specifically be-
low). On the other hand, it has also been argued that precautionary language in the Pro-
tocol remains “general, ambiguous, and qualified” (Safrin 2002: 626), and a closer look 
at individual contestable aspects of the precautionary principle is required for a more 
complete assessment. 
3.4.2 Status 
Regarding the status of the precautionary principle, the question of whether it should be 
regarded as principle or approach was among the sticking points during the negotiations 
(Mackenzie et al. 2003: 13). The Miami Group in particular argued that the Rio Decla-
ration, to which the BSWG’s mandate refers, speaks of an “approach” with no precise 
legal meaning and content, and that hence no specific precautionary provisions were 
mandated for the Protocol (Graff 2002: 413). The outcome is something of a counter-
intuitive mixture. On the one hand, reference to an “approach” rather than a “principle” 
is made in the section on objectives:  
                                                 
122  That fact that support of the developing world for the protocol was so strong may come as a surprise when con-
trasted to the WTO agricultural negotiations, during which the developing countries rather seemed to fear that 
some of the developed countries might unduly use precaution as a bargaining chip (see section 3.2 above). The 
difference probably has to do with the fact that GMOs are produced almost exclusively by corporations from de-
veloped countries but may well be sold also on developing countries’ markets. Developing countries were thus 
facing more costs than advantages if the precautionary principle was not included into the Cartagena Protocol, 
while they might have potential gains from keeping precaution off the WTO agenda. 
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“In accordance with the precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 of the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, the objective of this Protocol is […]” 
(Art. 1, emphasis added).   
On the other hand, the inclusion of specific precautionary provisions in the operational 
part would seem to confirm that precaution is something more than just an “approach” 
in the context of the Protocol. 
An assessment of the status of precaution in the Cartagena Protocol is further com-
plicated by its unclear relationship with certain provisions of WTO law, most notably 
those contained in the SPS Agreement. This lack of clarity is in part a corollary of the 
diverging opinions during the negotiation process. On the one hand, the Miami Group 
prevailed in having a “saving clause” inserted in the Protocol’s preamble, according to 
which  
“this Protocol shall not be interpreted as implying a change in the rights and obliga-
tions of a Party under any existing international agreements” (Recital no. 10).   
In the absence of such a clause, it was feared, “some nations [might] use [the Protocol] 
and its ‘precautionary language’ to justify import bans or other restrictions on LMOs 
without basing them on a scientific risk assessment” (Safrin 2002: 611). On the other 
hand, this clause is immediately followed by the assertion that  
“the above recital is not intended to subordinate this Protocol to other international 
agreements” (Recital no. 11).   
What the inclusion of both clauses does in legal terms is not quite clear123 and has been 
– along with the relationship of WTO law and the Protocol in general – the topic of a 
considerable amount of commentary and analysis. While some observers consider the 
two bodies of international law to be in tension with each other, even to represent “al-
ternative paradigms” (Phillips 2000), others consider them to be quite compatible with 
each other (e.g., Safrin 2002). 
3.4.3  Scope and measures 
The scope of the Cartagena Protocol, and by implication of its precautionary elements, 
is restricted insofar as it only refers to GMOs and not to products containing them. Also 
the Protocol is mainly concerned with GMOs for “intentional introduction into the envi-
ronment” of the importing party (Art. 7:1). The inclusion in the protocol of “living mo-
dified organisms intended for direct use as food or feed, or for processing” (LMO-FFPs) 
– which account for a much bigger part of trade in GMOs than those for release into the 
                                                 
123  The pending dispute settlement case EC – Measures affecting the marketing of biotech products (WT/DS 291, 
292, 293) might partially end this uncertainty, at least for practical purposes. The EC in its first submissions in-
vokes the Cartagena Protocol as a justification for its measures concerning the marketing of GMOs.  
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environment – was long resisted by the grain-exporting countries organised in the Mi-
ami Group, and this issue was an important reason for the breakdown of the Cartagena 
negotiations (ENDS Daily, 24 Feb 1999). In the end LMO-FFPs were indeed included, 
but compared to GMOs intended for release into the environment, possibilities to set 
import restrictions are more limited in their case. 
As mentioned above, in addition to the statement on objectives (and an almost iden-
tical formulation in the Preamble), the precautionary principle is also built into the op-
erational parts of the Protocol, which considerably expands the scope of its application. 
In this context it is therefore appropriate also to touch upon the question of what kind of 
precautionary measures are foreseen. First, GMOs intended for release into the envi-
ronment – including, most importantly for the time being, seeds – are subject to a an 
elaborate procedure of prior informed consent, called Advance Informed Agreement 
(AIA), the “backbone of the Protocol” (Cosbey and Burgiel 2000: 7) set out in Art. 8-
10. In this procedure the prospective exporter is obliged to provide the intended import-
ing country with extensive information (specified in Annex I to the Protocol), including 
a risk assessment report, before the first instance of importing any given GMO. The 
prospective importing country has a range of options for its reaction, including outright 
prohibition of the import. The crucial point with regard to precaution is that, according 
to Art. 10:6, 
“Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and 
knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modified or-
ganism […] shall not prevent [the Party of import] from taking a decision, as appropri-
ate, with regard to the import of the living modified organism in question […], in order 
to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects.”  
Secondly, GMOs intended for use as food or feed or for processing (LMO-FFPs) are 
subject to a simpler procedure, which basically establishes a mechanism of multilateral 
information exchange through the so-called Biosafety Clearing-House (Art. 11). The 
Clearing-House Mechanisms provides exporters with information about relevant laws 
and regulations in countries of import, and it provides the latter with information about 
LMO-FFPs that are admitted for domestic use in exporting countries and hence may 
become subject to transboundary movement. Under the Biosafety Clearing-House pro-
cedure, the exporter does not have to wait for the importing country’s reply to its notifi-
cation, but the latter ultimately retains the right to restrict the import of the organism in 
question in accordance with its domestic regulations (Art. 11:4). And, crucially, in rea-
ching a decision on the import of an LMO-FFP, as in the case of other LMOs, Parties 
are entitled to take into account the precautionary principle; the formulation of Art. 10:6 
is repeated verbatim in Art. 11:8. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 18) 
- 32 - 
Thirdly, the Protocol recognizes that some (developing and transition) countries may 
not yet have in place regulations pertaining to the import of LMO-FFPs. These coun-
tries are specifically required to conduct a risk assessment of the organism in question 
prior to deciding on its import or otherwise (Art. 11:6).124 Requirements for such risk 
assessments are further specified in Annex III to the Protocol. Among the “General 
principles” there it is noted that: 
“Lack of scientific knowledge or scientific consensus should not necessarily be inter-
preted as indicating a particular level of risk, an absence of risk, or an acceptable risk” 
(para. 4).  
The meaning of this paragraph is less than entirely clear, but it is read in at least parts of 
the literature as constituting a further instance of precautionary language in the Cart-
agena Protocol (Graff 2002: 418; Mackenzie et al. 2003: 13). If we go along with this 
interpretation, application of the precautionary principle extends to both risk assessment 
and risk management in the Protocol. 
3.4.4  Triggers and limits 
Having discussed the status and scope of the precautionary principle as enshrined in the 
Cartagena Protocol, as well as the precautionary measures which Parties are entitled to 
take, to complete the picture let us now briefly return to the relevant provisions and look 
at the “triggers” for precautionary measures, i.e., the conditions that must be fulfilled for 
such measures to be taken under the Protocol, and the limits imposed on the measures, 
i.e., the conditions specifying what kind of measures are regarded as legitimate in the 
Protocol. With regard to triggering factors, the threshold level is relatively low as far as 
the relevant kinds of damage are concerned.125 Both Art. 10:6 and 11:8 refer to  
“potential adverse effects of a living modified organism on the conservation and sus-
tainable use of biological diversity in the Party of import, taking also into account risks 
to human health”.   
Unlike in the Rio Declaration, “threats of serious or irreversible damage” are not re-
quired in this formulation for precautionary action to be taken (as noted also by Eggers 
and Mackenzie 2000: 532). The EC is reported to have insisted on this less demanding 
formulation, so as to ensure that Parties retain the right to determine for themselves the 
acceptable level of risk and protection on a case-by-case basis (Graff 2002: 418). From 
the opposite point of view, in particular the last part of the formulation, concerning 
                                                 
124 Apparently it is assumed that in countries with pertinent domestic regulations in place, these regulations provide 
for a risk assessment to be conducted anyway. 
125  Sandin (1999) refers to this as the “threat dimension”, to be distinguished from the “uncertainty dimension” of the 
precautionary principle (see also below, 4.2). 
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“risks to human health”, has been criticised as alien to the “original” objectives of the 
CBD – the conservation of biodiversity – and as unduly expanding the scope for precau-
tionary action (cf. Phillips 2000: 69). Again, this wording was introduced by the EC 
early on; it received support from many developing countries as well (Marquard 2002: 
293). 
Regarding the “uncertainty dimension” (Sandin 1999), on the other hand, the Cart-
agena Protocol does not appear to diverge significantly from the “mainstream” of rele-
vant international agreements. It, too, presupposes “potential adverse effects” to be de-
termined by way of scientific risk assessment, both in the case of LMO-FFPs (Art. 11:6, 
as cited above at note 124) and in the case of LMOs for release into the environment 
(Art. 10:1, referring to Art. 15 on risk assessment). While the requirement of a scientific 
risk assessment does not appear to have been controversial in the negotiations, there 
was disagreement over what kinds of knowledge would be relevant to the inference that 
uncertainty is given in a particular situation. The EC notably failed in its attempt to ex-
plicitly include uncertainty regarding the existence and the nature of potential adverse 
effects in addition to the extent of such effects, to which the Protocol now refers exclu-
sively (Graff 2002: 416, 418). Implicitly, however, the current formulation can still be 
seen to cover also uncertainty regarding “the nature of” potential adverse effects – an 
interpretation which would seem to be confirmed by Annex III on risk assessment, 
which includes both identification and evaluation of potential adverse effects among the 
objectives of risk assessment (Graff 2002: 419).  
Moreover, the Protocol significantly broadens the range of legitimate triggers of pre-
cautionary action insofar as it explicitly acknowledges “socio-economic considerations” 
(Art. 26) as legitimate reasons for restricting the import of LMOs, “especially with re-
gard to the value of biological diversity to indigenous and local communities” (Art. 
26:1). Insertion of this Article into the Protocol was a primary concern of the Like-
minded Group of developing countries, who saw this matter as closely related to the 
precautionary principle (Khwaja 2002). 
4 CONTESTED ASPECTS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
In Section 3 we have seen how specific aspects of the precautionary principle are con-
tested in different international settings, and how these contests are (temporarily) settled 
in the form of political agreements or legal rulings. In the present section we discuss our 
empirical findings with the help of an analytical framework which underlies much of 
the foregoing analysis, albeit not always explicitly. Building on several related efforts 
by other authors (inter alia, see Applegate 2000; Eggers 2001; Sandin 1999), this fra-
mework differentiates between two sets of issues that are potentially the subject of con-
testation: (1) the status and scope of applicability of the precautionary principle (includ-
ing whether it should at all be labelled a “principle”), and (2) the factors triggering the 
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application of precautionary measures (including different concepts of science). For a 
series of more specific questions contained in these two sets of issues, below we review 
the extent to which they played a role in the different fora and with what results. We 
also point to some salient differences between the real-world negotiations and scholarly 
debate, without, however, aiming at a comprehensive comparison. 
4.1 Status and scope of applicability 
The questions of what status the precautionary principle has, both in legal and in more 
general terms, and at what stages in the risk-analysis process it should be applied, were 
debated in all of the bodies we have dealt with in one way or another. Several more spe-
cific issues were contested. 
What role for the precautionary principle?  
In logical terms, before one can talk about how the precautionary principle should be 
interpreted or applied, the question of whether it should be applied at all – in a given 
issue area and/or a particular jurisdiction – naturally poses itself. In practical terms, both 
are hard to disentangle, since answers to the question of the principle’s general applica-
bility at least partially depend upon particular interpretations.126 The issue is further 
complicated by the fact that preferences may be couched in different languages. Law-
yers or negotiators of an international treaty, proficient in the use of “legalese”, will 
frequently express opposition to applying the principle by contending that it is not a 
legal principle at all (but may be – for example – “an approach”) and should hence not 
be applied in a certain context. Academic observers may more freely reject the princi-
ple, by giving – for example – economic or moral reasons for their position (e.g., Stew-
art 2002). We find both kinds of language in the real-world debates and in the academic 
literature. In the WTO Committees, for example, actors have succeeded in keeping the 
principle from reaching high levels of salience, based on arguments other than legal 
ones. However, in real-world debates the “legalese” variant is generally more important 
than in the academic literature. 
The legal literature, for its part, is deeply divided over the status of the principle in 
international law.127 Mostly, of course, advocates of a stronger role of the precautionary 
principle will claim that it is a principle in the legal sense, whereas opponents will not. 
                                                 
126  Witness especially the debate about “weak” and “strong” versions of the principle (Conko 2003; Stewart 2002; 
Van den Belt 2003). “Strong” versions are often rejected out of hand by authors who apply this distinction – but 
sometimes “weak” versions are rejected, too, insofar as they are deemed to be superfluous in comparison with 
more firmly established principles of decision-making. 
127  Cf. de Sadeleer (2002: 100, 318-9, affirming the precautionary principle’s status as customary international law) 
with Wiener and Rogers (2002: 25). (see Schroeter 2002:26 with further references) 
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There are, however, also some commentators who claim that a precautionary “ap-
proach” is generally more organised and leaves less room for subjective elements in 
decision-making than the “principle”.128 Still others downplay the difference between 
“principle” and “approach” altogether (see references in VanderZwaag 2002: 167). Fre-
quently the debates about whether the precautionary principle should be applied were 
indeed fought along the lines of “principle” vs. “approach”. Outcomes vary among the 
different fora: from no decision at all on the matter, be it for lack of interest (WTO Ap-
pellate Body) or lack of agreement (WTO Committees), to a compromise referring to 
“precaution” plain and simple (CAC), to a preference for the “precautionary approach” 
(owed, however, mainly to the Rio Declaration – Cartagena Protocol). Notably, the pre-
cautionary principle qua “principle” is not recognised in any of the settings we have 
studied.  
After all, one could say that the legal status of the principle did not play a decisive 
role in influencing outcomes. Rather, in the real-world debates the devil is in the details 
– and these details are not always discussed under the “precautionary” label. Even ac-
tors who refused to recognise the principle as principle were willing to discuss certain 
matters which could also have been discussed under the precaution label – for example, 
the role of science in decision-making or, as in the Codex, whether or not to set stan-
dards in case of scientific uncertainty.  
How does the precautionary principle relate to WTO law?  
A more specific question linked to both the precautionary principle’s legal status and its 
principled character (or lack thereof) is its relation to particular provisions of WTO law. 
This question was debated both in the WTO Dispute Settlement, where the Appellate 
Body denied the precautionary principle’s potential to guide the interpretation of the 
SPS Agreement, and in the CBD, where the issue of the “saving clause” generated 
much heat – and a legally ambiguous compromise solution.129 
At what stage(s) of the risk-analysis process should the principle be applied?  
As already indicated in the Introduction (p. 5), two of the stages risk regulation proc-
esses are commonly divided into are risk assessment (RA) and risk management (RM). 
How the precautionary principle relates to RM – the stage where the political decision 
about which measure to take is made – is not hard to see. With risk assessment – the 
                                                 
128  The process of pesticide approvals in the US is cited as an example for a precautionary “approach”, the alleged 
difference being that product must be allowed on the market at the end of procedure unless environmental or 
health risks can be shown to exist according to scientific standards (Conko 2003: 642).  
129  See above, p. 30; on the relation between the Cartagena Protocol and WTO law more generally also Eggers 
(2001:265-286), Rivera-Torres (2003) and Stewart (2003). 
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“science-driven” part of risk regulation – the connection is not that easy to detect. The 
precautionary principle might, however, be seen to play a role in dealing with uncertain-
ties arising in the course of scientific exploration already during the scientific process 
itself. Thus the setting of certain “science policies” (Walker 1998) which set forth de-
fault assumptions about modelling, extrapolation etc. might be conceived of as an appli-
cation of precaution, where they require scientists to assume, e.g., a rather higher prob-
ability of a certain risk occurring or a larger potential damage.  
The RA/RM distinction permeates international debates on the precautionary princi-
ple much more than one might expect on the basis of the scholarly literature, where 
most authors seem to take it for granted that RM is where the principle belongs.130 A-
gain, however, international outcomes vary – most markedly between the Codex Princi-
ples, which do not contain a specific reference to the principle in the context of either 
RA or RM, and the Cartagena Protocol, which contains such references in both con-
texts. 
4.2 Triggering conditions 
Perhaps the most broadly debated aspect of the precautionary principle concerns the 
conditions under which it should be applied to a particular problem. This aspect is de-
scribed in the literature in terms of “triggers” or “thresholds”.  
What exactly is meant by “scientific uncertainty”?  
In the dominant view of the precautionary principle as belonging to the realm of risk 
management (as opposed to risk assessment – see above), it can be meaningfully in-
voked only if available scientific data are not sufficient for a formal risk assessment to 
be performed in the first place. This presupposes that a reasonably sharp line can be 
drawn between situations of sufficient and insufficient scientific information, respec-
tively. Interestingly, in academic debates this presumption is challenged by both critics 
(Majone 2002: 104) and proponents (Fisher 2002: 9) of the precautionary principle. 
Within the realm of international law and politics, it is mainly the dispute settlement 
cases that touch upon this issue repeatedly. It seems fair to say, however, that a clear 
answer to the question of what kind of scientific uncertainty is necessary or sufficient 
for precautionary measures to be justified escapes even the WTO adjudicators – which 
is all the more remarkable because it is the very function of adjudicators to take decision 
of a yes/no (binary) type. In the political fora the issue is either not addressed in the first 
place (WTO Committees), or dropped off the agenda during the process (CAC), or sim-
ply restated in a close-to-tautological way (“lack of scientific certainty due to insuffi-
                                                 
130  Risk communication is generally considered as the third stage of the risk-analysis process, but apparently it is not 
seen as a potential field for precautionary action by either practitioners or academic observers. 
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cient relevant scientific information and knowledge” – Cartagena Protocol, Art. 10:6, 
11:8).  
How is “science” at large conceived of?  
The challenge of operationalising “scientific uncertainty” is related to ambiguities in the 
notion of “science” at large. Most generally speaking, if science is seen as an enterprise 
where controversy is the rule rather than the exception, and where constructive contri-
butions and normative decisions of the individual scientist are central to the results of 
scientific discovery, the results of a scientific investigation are always in a certain sense 
“uncertain”. In this view, uncertainty could be said to be inherent in science. The scien-
tific-uncertainty requirement will thus more often be fulfilled than not – which consid-
erably enlarges the space for the application of the precautionary principle. Conversely, 
the closer the underlying conception of science comes to an understanding of science as 
– in a strong sense – exakte Wissenschaft (the precise, objective part of science), the less 
space is left for the application of the precautionary principle. Uncertainty would in this 
concept rather be seen as something which for contingent reasons might occur occa-
sionally – as a shortcoming of disciplines which are generally capable of certain and 
true propositions. In both the WTO Dispute Settlement proceedings and the CAC nego-
tiations these issues were touched upon. Obviously, they cannot be settled by way of 
judicial or political decisions in the same way as the other issues discussed. We can thus 
only note the distribution of the different conceptions of science in international de-
bates, where both are clearly discernible but there is remarkably broad support for the 
first, “sociologically informed” understanding of science. 
What is the role of “non-scientific” factors?  
In addition to disputes about the meaning and the prevalence of scientific uncertainty, 
there is also a more fundamental debate about whether non-scientific considerations can 
and should play a role in triggering precautionary policies. The distinction between sci-
entific and non-scientific triggers was a matter for debate in several international fora, 
especially in the CAC and Cartagena Protocol negotiations. The Protocol stands out in 
this regard, insofar as it explicitly allows for import restrictions to be based also on so-
cio-economic considerations – even if it remains unclear to date what kind of specific 
considerations would actually pass the test of judicial review. The CAC Principles also 
allow for non-scientific factors to be taken into account, even if the scientific base of a 
standard is still emphasised as a sine-qua-non requirement. 
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5 WHEN, WHERE AND HOW DOES THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
MATTER? CONCLUDING HYPOTHESES 
Our analysis of the precautionary principle and its role in trade-related international 
debates suggests the following main conclusions:  
(1) It is difficult but not impossible for opponents of the principle to counter its at-
traction and keep it off the agenda of international decision-making. Even 
those who oppose the principle as legal principle do not decline to discuss the 
issues which the precautionary principle is meant to address – sometimes us-
ing a different label altogether, sometimes preferring terms like “precautionary 
approach”. Inside the WTO, and especially in its political bodies (as opposed 
to the dispute settlement), resistance appears to be stronger, or in any event 
more successful, than in the other institutional settings we have looked at (Co-
dex Alimentarius Commission, Conference of Parties to the Biodiversity Con-
vention). To the extent that the precautionary principle does become the sub-
ject of international debates, it is inevitably drawn into a process of increasing 
specification, regarding in particular its scope of application, the conditions 
that must be fulfilled for precautionary measures to be taken and – an aspect 
that we have not consistently pursued – the kind of measures that are consid-
ered appropriate.  
(2) While the drive towards increasing specification appears to be inherent in all 
the different fora, the results of this process vary considerably across interna-
tional institutions. This might be expressed in terms of the overall “precau-
tionary content” of the agreements reached or decisions made. By this we 
mean the degree to which an international governance structure enables the 
states which are part of it to take precautionary measures, i.e. regulatory meas-
ures in the absence of scientific certainty, and under what conditions. With re-
gard to our selection of cases we would consider the precautionary content 
highest in the Cartagena Protocol, moderate in the Codex Principles on Risk 
Analysis, moderate to low in the rulings of the WTO dispute settlement bod-
ies, and lowest in the WTO Committees.  
a) The Cartagena Protocol is a remarkably precautionary piece of interna-
tional law in three respects. First, it not only refers to precaution – if not 
the precautionary principle – in its preamble and section on objectives but, 
much more significantly, entitles Parties to restrict the import of GMOs in 
the face of scientific uncertainty about potential adverse effects they might 
have on the domestic environment or on human health. Secondly, the Pro-
tocol generally allows for import restrictions to be based also on socio-
economic considerations, even if it remains unclear to date what kind of 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 18) 
- 39 - 
specific considerations would actually pass the test of judicial review. And 
thirdly, even the Protocol’s provisions on risk assessment contain language 
which, although far from unambiguous, can be read as building an element 
of precaution into the process. 
b) In the Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the Frame-
work of the Codex Alimentarius, precaution has the status of an “inherent 
element”. Although this formulation falls short of adopting precaution as a 
principle, precaution still has a “systemic” status, being relevant to all 
processes of risk analysis. The action that the Principles prescribe for cases 
where evidence for a risk exists is, however, not that a standard ensuring a 
high level of protection be adopted, but rather that no standard be adopted 
at all. This, on the one hand, leaves countries the leeway to go for a high 
level of protection themselves, but also it does not urge them to do so. Both 
aspects together would make the precautionary content of the Principles ra-
ther seem moderate.  
c) In the SPS Agreement, as interpreted by the Appellate Body, the precau-
tionary principle is not a general principle and does not have any signifi-
cance beyond specific formulations contained in the Agreement. The most 
important of these formulations, Art. 5.7 SPS, seems to be, however, quite 
limited in reach, given that it only covers provisional measures.   
d) The WTO Committees, finally, have not even entered into serious negotia-
tions concerning precaution, much less produced any agreement with sig-
nificant precautionary content.  
Overall, we might hypothesise that the more specific the risk that must be regu-
lated – extreme cases in this respect: transboundary movement of a very spe-
cific category of products (Cartagena Protocol) vs. “trade and environment” as 
such (CTE) – and the more precise the mandate of the respective organisation 
to deal with it, the likelier is the institutionalisation of a relatively “strong” 
formulation of the principle.131  
(3) The precautionary principle has not been recognised as principle in the legal 
sense in any of the fora we have looked at. This does not mean that specific 
aspects of it could not be found in the legal norms negotiated – on the con-
trary, we have described these aspects at some length throughout this paper. 
                                                 
131  Of course, more contingent historical influences, such as the impact of the failed Seattle Ministerial Meeting of 
the WTO on the Cartagena negotiations (cf. Cosbey and Burgiel 2000: 13; Graff 2002: 414-5), may also have 
played a role. In and of themselves, however, these contingent factors are insufficient to explain the differences 
we observe between negotiations held in various international fora at about the same time. 
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The point is that negotiators in all of the fora we have looked at stopped short 
of referring to the “precautionary principle” as such. Instead they preferred to 
refer to an “approach” or to remain at the level of more concrete norms. Ap-
parently international actors did not want to bestow the precautionary principle 
(in the non-technical sense) with the special dignity and the legal weight that a 
genuine legal principle might have – neither in particular institutional settings 
nor in the system of international law as a whole. The latter concern is re-
flected in the frequent use by opponents of the principle of the argument that it 
is not a recognised principle (in the legal sense) of international law. 
(4) The precautionary principle is not recognised by all actors as a principle of in-
ternational law, but still it has observable effects. It structures debates, and it is 
not easily banned from the agenda of risk regulation, although the way it is ta-
ken into account and moulded into treaty norms varies considerably. This re-
sembles the function that some theorists ascribe to principles in a legal system: 
They secure that certain points of views or arguments are taken into account in 
a decision-making process without prescribing a specific final outcome (Alexy 
1995; Dworkin 1981). The precautionary principle seems to fulfil a very simi-
lar function – even without being a legally binding principle.   
Our observations thus call for further consideration of the conditions under which ab-
stract normative ideas (“principles” in a wider sense) at the international level have cer-
tain kinds of effect. The comparative-institutional approach employed here has gener-
ated a number of plausible hypotheses in this regard. In future work it would be desir-
able for these hypotheses to be linked to others which can be derived from legal and 
political theory as well as from empirical research in other areas. Also it would probably 
prove fruitful to supplement the comparative perspective, which looks at different inter-
national institutions one by one, by systematic consideration of different kinds of insti-
tutional interaction. The dynamics we have analysed are entirely on the “micro-level”, 
so to speak, of individual negotiations and debates, whereas more “macro” processes at 
the inter-institutional level are neglected.132 For practitioners such interaction is self-
evident. Political and legal scientists recently have also increased their attention to inter-
institutional relations on the international level (see above, note 7), but there remains 
much scope for interaction also between the disciplines. 
 
                                                 
132  Theofanis Christoforou alerted us to this point. 
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